Showing posts with label Haleon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Haleon. Show all posts

27 December 2023

My position sizing system

  • 5% initial position for a company incorporated in a developed market
  • 2% initial position for a company incorporated in an emerging market

My old position sizing system was a two percent initial buy plus an additional two percent later for companies incorporated in a developed market. I usually did this second buy after a few months of holding the first portion. The purpose of this lag was to get comfortable with the company in the meantime. Sometimes, I did not get such comfort and sold the share. Similarly, I bought half percent positions plus a half percent later on in emerging market companies. It was a careful start because I started a whole new portfolio. However, I ended up holding 75 shares. There is no way to follow 75 companies as a part-time private investor. 

There is a lot of research addressing the proper diversification of a stock portfolio. I believe the picture below illustrates somewhat of a consensus conclusion.

We can see that a portfolio with only one stock results in a huge standard deviation of its annual returns. Adding one stock reduces this standard deviation considerably. Assuming that the added stocks are equally weighted, the variability of the total portfolio goes down as we add more stocks. At some point, let's say at 25 stocks where the arrow is placed in the graph, adding stocks does not reduce variability in any significant way. 

The graph is compiled by looking at a large number of portfolios. We are looking at reality, not a theory. Nevertheless, this perspective on diversification is debated. Many value investors argue that variability does not represent risk; only permanent loss of capital does. The number of shares does not matter either, but rather how confident you are about the business prospects of the underlying companies after intense research. Charlie Munger was not afraid to hold only three shares. However, I do not have the quality of information, insight, experience, and advisors that Charlie Munger had access to. For now, I will go with the traditional concept of risk as expressed by the diversification graph above. 

In any case, I was severely over-diversified, holding 75 shares. It will be nearly impossible to beat an index fund with so many shares. I already experienced that a very successful 0.5% position, such as my triple return with Luckin Coffee, will barely affect my overall portfolio performance. I concluded that my 1% positions in emerging markets China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia did not make sense. I decided to take 5% positions in Malaysian companies from now on. For China, Thailand, Indonesia, and other emerging markets I will allocate 2% per company. That is still a small allocation, but I currently do not have the confidence to take a 5% position per company in these markets.

The reorganization

After deciding on my new position sizing rules, it was time to take action. I sold off a bunch of shares where I did not have the conviction to top them up to 5% or to 2% for a range of different reasons. This was a useful exercise in itself. I increased the allocations of all the remaining holdings, except for Greggs, ABF, Reckitt and Haleon, which already got too expensive. In the case of turn-around situation LG H&H, I want to wait for the Q4 2023 results. With the reorganization mostly done, I own 25 shares now. 

Further concentration?

Looking at the chart above, I could reduce my 25 positions further to 10 positions. The variability of the portfolio as a whole would not increase that much. I could start with taking 5% positions to 10% where I feel confident that a company is extremely undervalued, such as Boustead Singapore and Ibersol. However, from my past experiences as an investor, I have learned that my ex-ante level of confidence is often misplaced and irrelevant. There is no correlation between my level of confidence in a share pick and the subsequent performance of that share. 

As an example, my current best performers are Exotic Food PCL, Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group Corp Ltd and Associated British Foods PLC. I would never have guessed these picks as being my winners two years ago. I would probably have guessed Alibaba or Tencent then. Without a mechanical allocation system, I would have doubled down on these two stocks. This doubling-down behaviour is known as Get‐Evenitis or, more officially, loss-aversion bias. A mechanical sizing system is an antidote to this bias. It saved me from a bigger disaster in the Chinese tech space. 

Hence, I will stick to my mechanical allocation system. Should I ever change the current 5% and 2% sizing numbers, it will be wise to apply the new rules to all my shares, not to a selection.  


Disclosure: long position in all the shares mentioned, except Alibaba, Tencent, Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group Corp Ltd and Luckin Coffee, which I sold off

23 November 2023

Bought: a bunch of consumer staples stocks

I described how I liquidated my infrastructure-related stocks and REITs in earlier posts this year. I bought several companies in the consumer staples sector to replace these holdings. In the post about my L'Occitane buy, I clarified that I consider brand-based consumer staples stocks as inflation hedges. I let Warren Buffett present the reasoning through one of his quotes. Soon after buying L'Occitane, I also added Creightons to my cosmetics holdings. After these two, I bought several other consumer staples stocks, which I didn't describe yet. Time for an overview.

Bought: Italmobiliare SpA (ITM.IT)

Starting with yet another cosmetics company, at least partly. Italmobiliare is the majority owner of the oldest cosmetics brand in the world: Santa Maria Novella. It also owns the Italian coffee brand Borbonne. Both Santa Maria Novella and Borbonne are snowballing and developing their international expansion. Italmobiliare itself is the holding company for the Pesenti family, which has a long entrepreneurial history in the cement business, among other activities. The family runs Italmobiliare as an investment holding with a wide range of activities, where Borbonne and Santa Maria Novella are now by far the largest holdings.  

The idea was presented in the blog Value and Opportunity. This is the best European equity investment blog, in my opinion. I have been reading it for years, although I never had an investment in common with blogger memyselfandi007. Italmobiliare is the first. Another German blogger, Jonathan Neuscheler, followed up with his own analysis of Italmobiliare. Overall, Jonathan agreed with the findings of Value and Opportunity, and he bought the stock too.

Bought: Compagnie Du Bois Sauvage (COMB.BE)

Another family holding in Europe. This time in Belgium with the Paquot family in charge. The company makes and sells luxury chocolates under several brands: Neuhaus, Jeff de Bruges, Corné Port Royal en Artista Chocolates. Besides the chocolate business, the holding has minority investments in Umicore (batteries, recycling), Noël Group (extrusion of synthetic and bio-based materials), Berenberg Bank (German corporate banking), Ÿnsect (mealworms as alternative food), real estate in Europa and the US. Two smaller industrial holdings, Futerro and Galactic, are also involved in sustainability-related engineering.

There is not much public information about Compagnie Du Bois Sauvage, but I was still able to dig up some facts and draw conclusions from those. I will most likely share these soon in a separate blog posting.

Bought: Agronomics Ltd (LSE:ANIC)

This buy also deserves a separate blog post. Let me give a brief introduction for now. Agronomics is a venture capitalist investing in cellular agriculture. This means that Agronomics invests in companies that cultivate meat, but not by breeding, raising, and slaughtering animals in the traditional way. Instead, stem cell tissue is taken unobtrusively from an animal, transferred to a bioreactor and supplied with nutrients to grow it. Under the right conditions, the cells will grow into steaks and other meat products, sometimes within days. Note that the result is the same as a 'real' steak up to the molecular level. We are not talking about meat alternatives, where the experience of eating meat is simulated with plant-based ingredients such as soy, peas and gluten. (I find these disgusting, by the way.) Agronomics has a few older investments in such plant-based meat alternatives, but management decided to go all-in on cellular agriculture at some point.

Biotech companies are already producing edible, cultivated meat products, albeit in laboratories on a small scale and at very high costs per kilogram of food. Similar methods can also produce dairy, egg whites, seafood, chocolate, pet food, human breast milk, cotton, leather, and palm oil. Agronomics is involved in some of these initiatives too. Similar to cultivated meat production, the production is still at a small scale and has a very high cost per unit of end product. We are only in the beginning phase of this food revolution. Biotech startups are working on the consumer staples of the future. I found it suitable to include a company from this new food industry in my consumer staples portfolio.

Top-up: InNature Berhad (5295.KL)

InNature holds the rights to sell The Body Shop cosmetics in Malaysia (except Sarawak), Vietnam, and Cambodia. These rights are exclusive and apply to real-life shops as well as online stores. The bulk of sales is in Malaysia, where it is going well: high margins, high ROIC, and hardly any debt. I bought this family-owned company a year ago and have been following it ever since. The company's engagement with its target audience seems excellent. Over 70% of the group’s transactions come from its loyalty program members

There are definitely challenges to the business. Tourist visits to Malaysia have disappointed ever since the COVID-19 pandemic, and consumer sentiment is subdued among local shoppers. In response, the stock price dropped quite a bit during the last few months. However, I am optimistic about The Body Shop for the long term. If that optimism is warranted, the stock is cheap at 0.40 RM. I decided to take this opportunity to top-up my initial InNature Berhad holding and take it to a full 4% position.

Bought: DKSH Holdings Malaysia Berhad (5908.KL)

I bought another Malaysian company, albeit a subsidiary of DKSH Holding Ltd Switzerland. The company connects consumer brands such as BOH Tea, Kalbe Farma, and Horlicks with retail outlets, primarily supermarkets and convenience stores. Similarly, it distributes medicines from drug manufacturers to pharmacies and clinics. 

Can these manufacturers not organize their own distribution? Sometimes, they do, but specific skills, a good reputation and a network of business connections are essential. A supermarket operator is usually not interested in offering new, unproven products on its limited shelf space. It needs to be convinced that enough advertisement and promotion will be done. On a more practical level, some types of food and medicine need a cold supply chain and reliable transportation. I believe DKSH enjoys a competitive advantage, even a moat, with its position between these parties. Just like in the case of InNature, my attention was drawn to the falling share price. DKSH Malaysia's share price looked cheap when I pulled the trigger.

Bought: Chlitina Holding Ltd (4137.TW)

One last cosmetics company. I promise. Chlitina (pronounced: kelitina) is a cosmetics brand that started in Taiwan but now gets the bulk of its revenue and profits from Mainland China. This family-owned and operated company is a franchisor of beauty salons. It trains franchisees in the beauty business and helps them set up their own beauty salon. Chlitina makes its money from collecting franchise fees, but more importantly, by selling Chlitina-branded skincare and beauty products to the franchisees who re-sell those to their salon visitors.

This franchise model does not require much capital for Chlitina. Hence, its ROIC is typically between 20% and 30%, except during the COVID-19 lockdown periods during which the beauty salons were forced to close. Assuming a return to the pre-pandemic profits, the stock price seems low at a P/E = 17 and a Shiller P/E (where E is the average E over the last ten years) = 13. 

The Chlitina salon network is already quite extensive in China and Taiwan; about 5,000 under the Chlitina brand, and another 600 under the RnD Nail and Eyelash name. We can not expect hyper-growth here, but there are still geographical areas to expand into. Recently, the company launched its concept in Vietnam. In addition, it built an e-commerce platform to sell Chlitina products directly to end consumers. We can expect revenue growth here. However, management must avoid cannibalizing the business of its franchisee's salons too much. That would create a conflict of interest. 

Bought: Mega Lifesciences PCL (MEGA.BK)

Mega Lifesciences sells branded health supplements and herbal products, mostly over-the-counter products, but some prescription pharmaceutical products as well. In 1982, it started the Mega We Care brand in Thailand. Over the years, the company introduced Mega We Care all over Southeast Asia and in several African countries. 

In Myanmar, the company also has a distribution business, which markets primarily third-party pharmaceuticals. The revenues from Myanmar are 40% of Mega's total revenues. If you consider that risky, I agree. I decided to accept this risk because Mega seems an attractive investment on most other metrics: no debt load, very high ROIC, growth, and high free cash flows resulting in dividends and sensible re-investments. The relative contribution of the Myanmar-based business to Mega's total revenues is shrinking because of its fast growth in other markets. I also considered that neither the Myanmar government nor the rebellious forces would have any rational interest in destroying a pharmaceutical distribution network. Still, the different conflicts within Myanmar could seriously disrupt Mega's business. I managed this risk by allocating it just 1% of my portfolio.

Bought: PT Industri Jamu dan Farmasi Sido Muncul Tbk (SIDO.ID)

Sido Muncul provides herbal medicine, beverages, vitamins, supplements and pharmaceutical products. The business is comparable to Mega, but Sido Muncul has limited itself to Indonesia, where it has a widely-known brand name. The high margins, high ROIC, low debt burden, and growth figures are similar to Mega. We often see favorable financials with companies that provide over-the-counter personal care products, especially when their brands have been around for a long time and are trusted by consumers. People are generally quick to self-medicate with trusted products when they are in pain or feeling under the weather. It's a widespread habit, even among people who also consult a doctor when feeling bad. For that reason, I also have sector peers like Haleon, Reckitt, Haw Par, Da Ren Tang, Tong Ren Tang, Baiyunshan, PT Tempo Scan, and Kotra Industries in my portfolio. 

Bought: Kotra Industries Berhad (0002.KL)

As mentioned above, I bought shares in Kotra Industries, also known as Kotra Pharma. The reasons are similar to Mega and Sido Muncul. Kotra sells health supplements under the brand name Appeton. These supplements are sold over-the-counter and based on Western science, i.e. vitamins, omega-3, prebiotics, etc. Kotra has been selling these for decades, but only in recent years sales figures are taking off. The marketing is straightforward: supplements for children show pictures of children on the packaging, and those for the elderly show the elderly. There are also products for toddlers, pregnant women, athletes and skinny people who want to gain weight. Prices are low compared to competing products. Kotra has started selling Appeton in other Southeast Asian markets, as well as in several African countries.

Kotra Industries sells about 200 other pharmaceuticals in the over-the-counter market, as well as prescription-based. These products are lesser known than Appeton, but generally yield good sales numbers too. Prescription pharmaceutical sales are almost half of Kotra's total revenue. I find the prescribed medicine category harder to analyze than the over-the-counter sales. The first depends on regulatory developments, while the latter depends on excellent marketing. Therefore, I took a small (1%) position in Kotra instead of a full (4%) position. I may top up this position as my understanding of Kotra increases.


Disclosure: At the moment of publishing this blog: Long L'Occitane, Creightons, Italmobiliare, Compagnie du Bois Sauvage, Agronomics, InNature, DKSH Holdings Malaysia, Chlitina Holding Ltd, Mega Lifesciences, Sido Muncul, Haleon, Reckitt, Haw Par, Da Ren Tang, Tong Ren Tang, Baiyunshan, PT Tempo Scan, and Kotra Industries. No positions in Interactive Brokers, DKSH Holdings Ltd Switzerland, and Kalbe Farma.


15 February 2023

Stocks recently bought and sold

Bought: Haleon PLC (LSE:HLN)

Haleon provides over-the-counter consumer healthcare products such as Sensodyne, Centrum, Panadol, Advil, Voltaren, Theraflu, and Otrivin. Such products will always be bought to relieve pain or increase health. The business seems suitable for my Coffee Can approach. Haleon is a spin-off from pharmaceutical company GSK (GlaxoSmithKline), whose current management wants to focus on its prescription medicine business. The IPO of Haleon was in July 2022, so there is no annual report yet. I had to piece my information together from the prospectus, two quarterly reports and analyst call transcripts. While the share price doesn't represent deep value, Haleon is relatively inexpensive.

Bought: Reckitt (LSE:RKT)

This is the company formerly known as Reckitt Benckiser Group. It has a healthcare division comparable to Haleon with health-related products such as Clearasil, Strepsils, and Durex. In addition, they have hygiene-oriented products such as Dettol, Vanish, Air Wick, Calgon, Lysol, and Harpic. Then finally, baby and children's nutrition products Enfamil and Nutramigen. Like Haleon, the demand for these consumer products should be mostly non-cyclical. Reckitt is a much older company than Haleon. Its share price has been going nowhere for years because the company made some expensive mistakes with its acquisitions. The CEO responsible for those has left the company. I expect that the company has learned from these mistakes and will move forward more carefully in the coming years. 

Bought: Haw Par Corporation Limited (SGX:H02)

Another personal healthcare company with only one brand name: Tiger Balm. I use this product myself after visiting the gym. Not so much for 'pain relief' as advertised, but more to emphasise the 'after-glow' feeling following a good workout session. Tiger Balm is trying to expand its product range to plasters, lotions, and even mosquito repellents. Besides the Tiger Balm business, Haw Par runs the Underwater World Pattaya aquarium and owns four commercial properties in Singapore and Malaysia. Its passive investments are a 4.5% share in UOB Bank Singapore, an 8.5% share in UOL, a developer in Singapore, and 600 mln in SGD cash on the balance sheet. If you analyse this collection of assets in detail, you will learn it is organised around the Wee family from Singapore. Family holdings like these are standard in Asia. Such shares will not give you quick profits through share price movements. The thesis rather lies in the safety of the assets and a decent dividend. 

Bought: Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group Corporation Limited (SGX:T14)

My final new buy in the consumer healthcare sector is a TCM company. A small position at not even 0.5% because the data I could collect about this business was minimal. The company is based in China. Unfortunately, its English 'Annual Report' is nothing more than the answers to the questions that the Singaporean Exchange provides as a framework for reporting. The answers provide a bare minimum of required data. It is hard to detect any tone of voice or indicator of mood from the management. Da Ren Tang is a 3 billion USD large-cap company, listed in 1997 and providing dividends all that time. Therefore, it is unlikely to be a fraudulent S-Chip. The goal of fraudsters is to collect money, not to distribute it. Finally, Da Ren Tang has no debts and a high ROIC. Its valuation seems decent, even low.

Sold: Okamoto Industries Inc (JPN:5122)

I sold Okamoto, a manufacturer of condoms. This company does not publish financial reports in English. Since I don't master Japanese, I always used Google Translate to gain insight into the views and strategies of the management. I did not get the gist of the limited comments they made. I am unsure whether the Google translations were poor or the words did not have much substance in the first place. While preparing my blog about family-owned companies, I discovered that the Okamoto family only holds 13% of the shares. That seems a relatively small commitment to support the 'skin-in-the-game' argument for family-owned companies. In summary, my conviction in Okamoto disappeared, and I sold it at a slight loss. 

Bought: WH Group Limited (HKSE:0288)

Another share where I only have just enough conviction. WH Group Limited engages in the production, wholesale, and retail sale of meat products in China, the United States, Mexico, and Europe. They have known meat brand names in all these regions. What are the advantages of such a worldwide approach? However, both the business and the share price are stable over time. 

Sold: Yum China Holdings, Inc. (HKSE:9987)

Yum China is the franchise holder for Pizza Hut, KFC, Taco Bell, Lavazza Coffee and a few local restaurant brands for Mainland China. Business is going well, and the share price has soared. When I bought this share, it was already priced high, but it has reached an extreme valuation by now. Just as an indication: the P/E is around 60. It is too optimistic. Let's consider that even when the expected growth occurs, there will be enormous workforce challenges. A restaurant chain does not scale up quickly and will need many workers. I decided to take my profits for now. I have put Yum China back on the watchlist and might purchase it again if it drops to an attractive valuation. 

Partially Sold: Luckin Coffee Inc (OTC:LKNCY)

My Luckin shares had a fantastic run. I bought my position for 9.95 USD per share, and it's nearing 30.00 USD now. Management is solving the issues related to the earlier fraud one by one while simultaneously growing the number of shops at a high pace. Let's hope they can soon re-list the shares on a regular exchange. Despite all the good news, I sold about 40% of my Luckin shares. The current share price represents a total market cap of 7.5 billion USD. The share may have reached a fair value by now. By selling 40% of my holding at almost 300% return, I am locking in my purchase price for the total holding plus some profits. Wherever Luckin's share price goes, I already made an overall profit. I will hold on to the remaining 60% and wait for a re-listing event before I decide on further actions.  

Shares in the most prominent Chinese coffee chain belong in a portfolio called Coffee Can APAC. However, at this stage, I am worried about the over-the-counter status of the stock. I also suspect that the meme-stock crowd is partly responsible for the recent share price rally. Luckin was mentioned on the WSB Reddit. Stocktwits and regular Tweets about Luckin are mostly meme pictures and hollow phrases cheering on the share price without providing any analysis of its fundamentals. That is all fine and well, but such uninformed investor herds can drop a share at a hat's tip again. 

Bought: Oriental Holdings Bhd (KLS:4006)

Oriental Holdings runs dealerships for Honda cars in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei and for the Mitsubishi brand only in Malaysia. It also holds a 15% stake in the Malaysian assembler and distributor of Honda cars. In addition, it makes plastic products to support car manufacturing. The second most significant activity of Oriental Holdings is owning and managing oil palm plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, it owns nine hotels which are marketed under the Bayview label. It also built and runs a hospital in Malacca, Malaysia, and trades building materials. Yes, it is a conglomerate entering my portfolio again, violating my checklist a few times. Yet, the long-term vision behind the management's approach gives this share a Coffee Can vibe. Oriental Holdings holds a lot of real estate and land, which seems undervalued on its balance sheet. This will be interesting to explore in future blogs. The stock is locally considered 'sleepy', but occasional announcements prove that the management is actively developing the business. Recently, some plantations co-owned with the Loh family, the majority owner of Oriental Holdings, were sold to the holding, which now has full ownership. This should raise revenues and profits in the short term.  

Sold: Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust (SGX:T82U)

I did some rethinking about my REIT holdings; let's call it REIThinking. Interest rates have been rising recently, which prompted me to look at the debt levels of my current REIT holdings. Suntec has a Gearing Ratio of 43.7%. The Interest Rate Coverage is 2.6, while only 53% of its debt is financed with fixed interest rates. As a side note, I rely on the excellent blog REIT_TIREMENT for financial summaries on all Singaporean REITs. Suntec was the weakest among all my REIT holdings on debt indicators. I don't think Suntec is in distress in any way. Nevertheless, it is my preference to switch to other investments.

Sold: ESR-Logos REIT (SGX:J91U)

A similar story to Suntec. Gearing is 41.8% with an ICR of 2.8. At least, ESR-Logos secured 72% of debts at fixed interest rates. The weighted average debt maturity is 2.9 years. Besides the leverage, I am worried about the involvement of ESR Group Ltd in several of my REIT holdings, as I expressed in an earlier blog. The fundamentals of ESR Group itself do not look rock-solid to me. Of course, it is just the sponsor and manager of my REITs, but with deteriorating financials, there might be an impact on the REITs they own and manage. For my own peace of mind, I will cut some exposure. 

Sold: Sunway REIT (KLS:5176)

Sunway REIT is Malaysian and not covered by REIT-TIREMENT, so I had to go out and collect the relevant data myself. Unfortunately, the leverage picture was not pretty. Gearing 41%, ICR is 2.8, with only 32% of the debt on fixed rates. On a different note, I don't like it when a REIT has one dominant party as its tenant. I recently wrote a new checklist item on that. In this case, that predominant tenant is Sunway Berhad, albeit through different legal entities. Can you really negotiate rents freely with such a dominant tenant? Again, there is no sign of immediate distress concerning this REIT. It's just me following my checklist rules.

Sold: Camellia PLC (LSE:CAM)

As I described earlier, this company violates three of my checklist rules. The business is commodity-based, organised as a conglomerate and primarily located in India and Africa. It is a problematic business sector, and the company needs better management. Lately, they have shown some willingness to dispose of non-core activities. They also vacated its posh headquarters to re-develop it for residential purposes. But it is too little, too late. I sold most of my holdings and will sell the remaining part when I need liquidity for another share purchase.

Sold:  JD.COM (HKSE:9618), Alibaba (HKSE:9988), Tencent (HKSE:0700), Meta Platforms (META)

I sold all my online platform shares, some of them at a considerable loss. I recently concluded that I find it impossible to truly understand these businesses. When I started my Coffee Can portfolio in early 2022, I defined three pillars to distinguish my shareholdings: 1) Consumer Staples 2) Infrastructure 3) Large online platforms. I came up with these buckets because most of my existing shareholdings were within these categories already.  

During 2022, we learnt that political developments strongly impact the profitability of large internet companies. Chinese government interferes in different ways than the US government, but government actions are hard to predict in both countries. Adding to the complexity, we also need to foresee whether the companies remain relevant from a technological and marketing perspective. For example, I read dozens of articles, tweets and blogs on the Metaverse, but I am still unsure whether this will pan out in any usable way. Following online businesses and thinking about the technology sector proved time-consuming and impractical. I opted for simplicity and dropped bucket 3) altogether. I should have a 'too hard' basket if Warren Buffett has one too.

Sold: Sun Art Retail Group Limited (HKSE:6808)

This sell trade is linked to the Alibaba sell-off mentioned above. Alibaba has a majority share in Sun Art Retail. Management is combining the operations of both entities. The share price movements of both listings correlate strongly. There will likely be a take-over offer by Alibaba for Sun Art at some point. I see no particular value in holding on to Sun Art.

Conclusion

As a buy-and-hold investor, I did an awful lot of trading. I chalk this up to the startup hurdles of the Coffee Can project. First, I sold some existing holdings that do not conform to the Coffee Can idea. Later on, I made the strategic decision to drop the technology bucket 3). This resulted in five sell trades as described above. Then I made some improvements to my buy checklist. I added requirements, such as a diversified tenant base for REITs. In addition, I sold off some weaker REITs in response to rising interest rate levels. Then finally, I took some profits with Yum China and Luckin. 

I held 75 shares at some point. I reduced this to 64 holdings, which is still too much to keep track of. I will likely sell some weaker shares to bring the total down. Furthermore, I will keep taking profits when share prices soar to ridiculous levels. Even with these two reasons to trade, I expect to slow my overall trading activity.

Disclosure: I hold Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group, Reckitt, Haleon, Luckin Coffee, WH Group, Oriental Holdings and Haw Par Corporation at the time of this writing