I sold all my REITs except one

I started my REIT selling spree in early 2023 with the disposals of Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust (SGX:T82U), ESR-Logos REIT (SGX:J91U), and Sunway REIT (KLS:5176) as described in this blog.  My two main concerns are rising interest rates and the relatively short weighted average land lease expiry (WALL-E) that some REITs in Singapore and China are facing. I didn't stop at these three REITS and eventually sold all my REIT holdings for the same reasons. Except for Daiwa House Logistics REIT. Let's go through the details case by case. 

Sold out: CapitaLand China Trust (SGX:AU8U)

Well-run REIT with diversified properties in Mainland China. The WALL-E is below 25 years. I heard that land leases are usually extended in China, but that is anecdotal information. There is still a possibility that a property will lose its underlying land lease holding and must be demolished. Even if a land lease is extended, there is still uncertainty up to the moment of that decision. Suppose a property's land lease expiry is 8 years away and needs some renovations or enhancements. Management can not spend much money because it potentially has only 8 years to earn that investment back. This uncertainty is hard to quantify. The Capitaland China Trust currently has a dividend yield near 7%. It is too low for me to compensate the investor for these land lease expiry risks.

Sold out: China Merchants Commercial REIT (HKEX:1503)

This REIT is also active in Mainland China and has a dividend yield of 14%, which is appealing. Yet, I exited this HK-listed REIT with a -13.23% loss (including dividends received). Like Capitaland China Trust, the WALL-E of the land under the properties is below 25 years. Furthermore, its debt is higher than its equity. The interest coverage rate (ICR) of 3.2 worries me too much. Also, this REIT's debt repayments are not staggered over the years. It agreed on just one revolving loan facility, which is renewed every three years. This seems risky to me. I should have noticed this detail before buying this REIT. In 2022, I bought too many REITs in a short time period. At the time, I naively assumed that REITs are an ultra-safe asset class and don't need deep-dive research.

Sold out: Cromwell European REIT (SGX:CWBU) 

I like this REIT with its good logistics and office properties all over Europe. Almost all of its properties are on freehold land. The ICR is 4.9, which seems very safe until we realize that Cromwell has been borrowing at an average interest rate of only 2.4 %. One can no longer borrow at those rates in the new interest rate environment. This means that when Cromwell's debt agreements expire, it has to refinance at higher rates; 2.4 % becomes 5%, for example. The ICR will drop from 5 to only 2.5 in that example. Of course, Cromwell can raise the rents on their tenants to prevent that, but can they double the rents to keep up with doubling finance costs? I doubt that. 

ESR Group Ltd ultimately owns a large stake in Cromwell European REIT (HKEX:1821). I have expressed worries about the leverage of this group. In addition, I observed that Cromwell European REIT does not seem to fit their profile. By now, ESR Group has indeed announced its desire to sell Cromwell Property Group and Cromwell European REIT. But who will buy this in the current commercial real estate environment? The REIT seems somewhat orphaned now. I believe it is better to side-step these developments for the time being. However, I will keep an eye on Cromwell European REIT and possibly reinvest in the future.

Sold out: Axis REIT (5106.KL) 

This is a well-run Malaysian REIT with industrial and logistics properties. However, the price-to-book value has risen to 1.2 by now. I do not see a reason to pay more than the REIT's self-published net asset value. If anything, we should pay less, assuming the property value estimations ordered by management are likely to be too optimistic. With interest rates rising, capitalization rates are rising, and NAV calculation results will decrease. I am not sure why the market is paying more than the published NAV per share. I held Axis REIT for about a year and earned a decent 6.4% yield in price appreciation plus dividends. I am putting Axis back on my watch list for potential re-investment, for example, if the P/B drops back to 1.

Sold out: AIMS APAC REIT (SGX:O5RU)

Another well-run industrial REIT, but there are some leverage concerns. This REIT has issued a lot of perpetual bonds (perps). The holders of these bonds get paid before the unit holders get paid. In the case that AIMS APAC experiences liquidity issues, they can skip a perps coupon payment at a moment where they also skip the dividend payment to regular unit holders. They have two lines of defence, so to speak, and hence there are two ICR numbers to publish. AIMS APAC lists an ICR of 3.8, excluding distributions to perpetual bondholders and 2.3, including distributions to perpetual bondholders (As of 31 March 2023). I believe that a regular unit holder should use the second number. An ICR of 2.3 seems really low. AIMS APAC has been enjoying a debt funding cost of only 3.4%. Permanently higher interest rates will eventually affect this REIT. 

Sold out: Frasers Centrepoint Trust (SGX:J69U)

This REIT has nine retail malls and an office building in Singapore. Its ICR = 4.4 as of 31 March 2023. When an ICR dives below 1, it becomes problematic as the operating income (EBIT) does not even cover the interest payments, let alone dividend payments. This is unlikely to happen with Frasers Centrepoint, but an increase in finance costs will still have to be financed. This can only be done by a decrease in dividend payments unless it can raise rents drastically. Looking at a weighted average debt maturity of not even 2 years, we know that Frasers has to renegotiate a large part of its fixed-rate debt agreements. 

Instead of repeating my interest rate worries again, let me introduce two Youtubers with similar concerns. SingvestingDiary is worried about higher interest rates for the long term and finds the dividend yield of Frasers Centrepoint insufficient to compensate for this. Gabriel Yap is even more bearish on Frasers Centrepoint and believes the management is too aggressive with its acquisitions for the REIT. Note that the production quality of these Youtube clips is poor, but both have some worthwhile analysis to share. Finally, this article may be interesting if you prefer a similar analysis, although not specifically about Frasers, in written format. 

Sold out: Sabana Industrial REIT (SGX:M1GU)

Sabana has 18 industrial properties, all located in Singapore. All my fears come together in this one REIT. The WALL-E is only 30 years (1 January 2023). That means we lose 3.33% in value to the decay in the remaining land lease value. Hence, of the current 7% dividend yield, only 3.66% is of real value to us. Looking at the debt, we see an ICR of 3.8 on 31 March 2023. Not disastrous, but not very good either. 

To complete my nightmare, ESR Group is involved in Sabana too. ESR attempted to merge Sabana with ESR REIT (Now ESR-LOGOS) with a lowball payout offer. Since it holds only about 20% of Sabana, other shareholders were able to block this transaction. The feuds between the shareholders didn't end there. News of disagreements between Sabana plus ESR management versus other shareholders keeps popping up in the local business media. I want to have no part in this.

Sold out: Frasers Logistics & Commercial Trust (SGX:BUOU)

The disposal of Frasers Logistics & Commercial Trust at a small loss concludes my REIT sell-fest. The ICR of this REIT is 8.4 (31 March 2023), and the WALL-E is 88 years (30 September 2023). My two pet peeve concerns are non-issues here. The REIT is conservatively managed with regard to debt. The properties are mostly located in Australia, where freehold land holdings are the norm. 

So why did I sell? The share price seems high compared to different valuation estimates. Also, I have no insights at all into the Australian commercial real estate market. A few articles suggest that this market is in bubble territory, and weakness is to be expected here. When I came across a cheap consumer staple stock, I sold Frasers Logistics & Commercial Trust to free up funds to buy it. 

I will write about my consumer staples stock buy-fest in the next posting. First, let me wrap up this blog by featuring the last remaining REIT in my portfolio.

Hold: Daiwa House Logistics REIT (SGX:DHLU)

This REIT has 16 large logistics properties in Japan. These warehouses are, on average, only 5 years old. The WALL-E is 67 Years (1 January 2023), and the ICR is 11.4 (31 March 2023). No concerns here. With a Price to FFO of 14.07 and a dividend yield of 9.4%, the REIT seems very cheap considering the quality of the assets. 

The consistent drop of the Japanese Yen against the Singapore Dollar since late 2021 could offer an explanation for the low share price of Daiwa House Logistics REIT. Its share price decline correlates with the Yen decline. The REIT is listed in Singapore, and most of its unit holders are also based in Singapore. The weak Yen means that the REITs' dividend will be lower when converted into Singapore Dollars. It looks like the REIT's share price dropped because unit investors seek a higher dividend yield to compensate for this currency loss. 

Besides the currency rate issue, I don't see any fundamental reason for Daiwa House Logistics REIT to be priced so low. Its logistics business does not seem distressed or irrelevant in any way. We know that Japan is facing an ageing and declining population, but this would first affect labour-intensive sectors such as shops and restaurants rather than e-commerce. If anything, remote areas in Japan will depend more on e-commerce to receive necessities. 

Daiwa House Logistics REIT does not face typical Japanese corporate governance issues. Management consists of Japanese and Singaporean individuals, as does the board. IR materials are in English. Strategy and operational issues are clearly described. I went to the REIT's first AGM. Board members and management seemed frank and open towards investor questions and feedback. The payout ratio of dividends out of income is mandated at 90% by the Singaporean REIT regime. Hence, there can be no hoarding of cash on the balance sheet. Unlike in Japan, there is no withholding tax on dividends in Singapore. Enough reasons to hold on to Daiwa House Logistics REIT.

Disclosure: Long Daiwa House Logistics at the time of this writing

Stocks recently bought and sold

Bought: Haleon PLC (LSE:HLN)

Haleon provides over-the-counter consumer healthcare products such as Sensodyne, Centrum, Panadol, Advil, Voltaren, Theraflu, and Otrivin. Such products will always be bought to relieve pain or increase health. The business seems suitable for my Coffee Can approach. Haleon is a spin-off from pharmaceutical company GSK (GlaxoSmithKline), whose current management wants to focus on its prescription medicine business. The IPO of Haleon was in July 2022, so there is no annual report yet. I had to piece my information together from the prospectus, two quarterly reports and analyst call transcripts. While the share price doesn't represent deep value, Haleon is relatively inexpensive.

Bought: Reckitt (LSE:RKT)

This is the company formerly known as Reckitt Benckiser Group. It has a healthcare division comparable to Haleon with health-related products such as Clearasil, Strepsils, and Durex. In addition, they have hygiene-oriented products such as Dettol, Vanish, Air Wick, Calgon, Lysol, and Harpic. Then finally, baby and children's nutrition products Enfamil and Nutramigen. Like Haleon, the demand for these consumer products should be mostly non-cyclical. Reckitt is a much older company than Haleon. Its share price has been going nowhere for years because the company made some expensive mistakes with its acquisitions. The CEO responsible for those has left the company. I expect that the company has learned from these mistakes and will move forward more carefully in the coming years. 

Bought: Haw Par Corporation Limited (SGX:H02)

Another personal healthcare company with only one brand name: Tiger Balm. I use this product myself after visiting the gym. Not so much for 'pain relief' as advertised, but more to emphasise the 'after-glow' feeling following a good workout session. Tiger Balm is trying to expand its product range to plasters, lotions, and even mosquito repellents. Besides the Tiger Balm business, Haw Par runs the Underwater World Pattaya aquarium and owns four commercial properties in Singapore and Malaysia. Its passive investments are a 4.5% share in UOB Bank Singapore, an 8.5% share in UOL, a developer in Singapore, and 600 mln in SGD cash on the balance sheet. If you analyse this collection of assets in detail, you will learn it is organised around the Wee family from Singapore. Family holdings like these are standard in Asia. Such shares will not give you quick profits through share price movements. The thesis rather lies in the safety of the assets and a decent dividend. 

Bought: Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group Corporation Limited (SGX:T14)

My final new buy in the consumer healthcare sector is a TCM company. A small position at not even 0.5% because the data I could collect about this business was minimal. The company is based in China. Unfortunately, its English 'Annual Report' is nothing more than the answers to the questions that the Singaporean Exchange provides as a framework for reporting. The answers provide a bare minimum of required data. It is hard to detect any tone of voice or indicator of mood from the management. Da Ren Tang is a 3 billion USD large-cap company, listed in 1997 and providing dividends all that time. Therefore, it is unlikely to be a fraudulent S-Chip. The goal of fraudsters is to collect money, not to distribute it. Finally, Da Ren Tang has no debts and a high ROIC. Its valuation seems decent, even low.

Sold: Okamoto Industries Inc (JPN:5122)

I sold Okamoto, a manufacturer of condoms. This company does not publish financial reports in English. Since I don't master Japanese, I always used Google Translate to gain insight into the views and strategies of the management. I did not get the gist of the limited comments they made. I am unsure whether the Google translations were poor or the words did not have much substance in the first place. While preparing my blog about family-owned companies, I discovered that the Okamoto family only holds 13% of the shares. That seems a relatively small commitment to support the 'skin-in-the-game' argument for family-owned companies. In summary, my conviction in Okamoto disappeared, and I sold it at a slight loss. 

Bought: WH Group Limited (HKSE:0288)

Another share where I only have just enough conviction. WH Group Limited engages in the production, wholesale, and retail sale of meat products in China, the United States, Mexico, and Europe. They have known meat brand names in all these regions. What are the advantages of such a worldwide approach? However, both the business and the share price are stable over time. 

Sold: Yum China Holdings, Inc. (HKSE:9987)

Yum China is the franchise holder for Pizza Hut, KFC, Taco Bell, Lavazza Coffee and a few local restaurant brands for Mainland China. Business is going well, and the share price has soared. When I bought this share, it was already priced high, but it has reached an extreme valuation by now. Just as an indication: the P/E is around 60. It is too optimistic. Let's consider that even when the expected growth occurs, there will be enormous workforce challenges. A restaurant chain does not scale up quickly and will need many workers. I decided to take my profits for now. I have put Yum China back on the watchlist and might purchase it again if it drops to an attractive valuation. 

Partially Sold: Luckin Coffee Inc (OTC:LKNCY)

My Luckin shares had a fantastic run. I bought my position for 9.95 USD per share, and it's nearing 30.00 USD now. Management is solving the issues related to the earlier fraud one by one while simultaneously growing the number of shops at a high pace. Let's hope they can soon re-list the shares on a regular exchange. Despite all the good news, I sold about 40% of my Luckin shares. The current share price represents a total market cap of 7.5 billion USD. The share may have reached a fair value by now. By selling 40% of my holding at almost 300% return, I am locking in my purchase price for the total holding plus some profits. Wherever Luckin's share price goes, I already made an overall profit. I will hold on to the remaining 60% and wait for a re-listing event before I decide on further actions.  

Shares in the most prominent Chinese coffee chain belong in a portfolio called Coffee Can APAC. However, at this stage, I am worried about the over-the-counter status of the stock. I also suspect that the meme-stock crowd is partly responsible for the recent share price rally. Luckin was mentioned on the WSB Reddit. Stocktwits and regular Tweets about Luckin are mostly meme pictures and hollow phrases cheering on the share price without providing any analysis of its fundamentals. That is all fine and well, but such uninformed investor herds can drop a share at a hat's tip again. 

Bought: Oriental Holdings Bhd (KLS:4006)

Oriental Holdings runs dealerships for Honda cars in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei and for the Mitsubishi brand only in Malaysia. It also holds a 15% stake in the Malaysian assembler and distributor of Honda cars. In addition, it makes plastic products to support car manufacturing. The second most significant activity of Oriental Holdings is owning and managing oil palm plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, it owns nine hotels which are marketed under the Bayview label. It also built and runs a hospital in Malacca, Malaysia, and trades building materials. Yes, it is a conglomerate entering my portfolio again, violating my checklist a few times. Yet, the long-term vision behind the management's approach gives this share a Coffee Can vibe. Oriental Holdings holds a lot of real estate and land, which seems undervalued on its balance sheet. This will be interesting to explore in future blogs. The stock is locally considered 'sleepy', but occasional announcements prove that the management is actively developing the business. Recently, some plantations co-owned with the Loh family, the majority owner of Oriental Holdings, were sold to the holding, which now has full ownership. This should raise revenues and profits in the short term.  

Sold: Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust (SGX:T82U)

I did some rethinking about my REIT holdings; let's call it REIThinking. Interest rates have been rising recently, which prompted me to look at the debt levels of my current REIT holdings. Suntec has a Gearing Ratio of 43.7%. The Interest Rate Coverage is 2.6, while only 53% of its debt is financed with fixed interest rates. As a side note, I rely on the excellent blog REIT_TIREMENT for financial summaries on all Singaporean REITs. Suntec was the weakest among all my REIT holdings on debt indicators. I don't think Suntec is in distress in any way. Nevertheless, it is my preference to switch to other investments.

Sold: ESR-Logos REIT (SGX:J91U)

A similar story to Suntec. Gearing is 41.8% with an ICR of 2.8. At least, ESR-Logos secured 72% of debts at fixed interest rates. The weighted average debt maturity is 2.9 years. Besides the leverage, I am worried about the involvement of ESR Group Ltd in several of my REIT holdings, as I expressed in an earlier blog. The fundamentals of ESR Group itself do not look rock-solid to me. Of course, it is just the sponsor and manager of my REITs, but with deteriorating financials, there might be an impact on the REITs they own and manage. For my own peace of mind, I will cut some exposure. 

Sold: Sunway REIT (KLS:5176)

Sunway REIT is Malaysian and not covered by REIT-TIREMENT, so I had to go out and collect the relevant data myself. Unfortunately, the leverage picture was not pretty. Gearing 41%, ICR is 2.8, with only 32% of the debt on fixed rates. On a different note, I don't like it when a REIT has one dominant party as its tenant. I recently wrote a new checklist item on that. In this case, that predominant tenant is Sunway Berhad, albeit through different legal entities. Can you really negotiate rents freely with such a dominant tenant? Again, there is no sign of immediate distress concerning this REIT. It's just me following my checklist rules.

Sold: Camellia PLC (LSE:CAM)

As I described earlier, this company violates three of my checklist rules. The business is commodity-based, organised as a conglomerate and primarily located in India and Africa. It is a problematic business sector, and the company needs better management. Lately, they have shown some willingness to dispose of non-core activities. They also vacated its posh headquarters to re-develop it for residential purposes. But it is too little, too late. I sold most of my holdings and will sell the remaining part when I need liquidity for another share purchase.

Sold:  JD.COM (HKSE:9618), Alibaba (HKSE:9988), Tencent (HKSE:0700), Meta Platforms (META)

I sold all my online platform shares, some of them at a considerable loss. I recently concluded that I find it impossible to truly understand these businesses. When I started my Coffee Can portfolio in early 2022, I defined three pillars to distinguish my shareholdings: 1) Consumer Staples 2) Infrastructure 3) Large online platforms. I came up with these buckets because most of my existing shareholdings were within these categories already.  

During 2022, we learnt that political developments strongly impact the profitability of large internet companies. Chinese government interferes in different ways than the US government, but government actions are hard to predict in both countries. Adding to the complexity, we also need to foresee whether the companies remain relevant from a technological and marketing perspective. For example, I read dozens of articles, tweets and blogs on the Metaverse, but I am still unsure whether this will pan out in any usable way. Following online businesses and thinking about the technology sector proved time-consuming and impractical. I opted for simplicity and dropped bucket 3) altogether. I should have a 'too hard' basket if Warren Buffett has one too.

Sold: Sun Art Retail Group Limited (HKSE:6808)

This sell trade is linked to the Alibaba sell-off mentioned above. Alibaba has a majority share in Sun Art Retail. Management is combining the operations of both entities. The share price movements of both listings correlate strongly. There will likely be a take-over offer by Alibaba for Sun Art at some point. I see no particular value in holding on to Sun Art.

Conclusion

As a buy-and-hold investor, I did an awful lot of trading. I chalk this up to the startup hurdles of the Coffee Can project. First, I sold some existing holdings that do not conform to the Coffee Can idea. Later on, I made the strategic decision to drop the technology bucket 3). This resulted in five sell trades as described above. Then I made some improvements to my buy checklist. I added requirements, such as a diversified tenant base for REITs. In addition, I sold off some weaker REITs in response to rising interest rate levels. Then finally, I took some profits with Yum China and Luckin. 

I held 75 shares at some point. I reduced this to 64 holdings, which is still too much to keep track of. I will likely sell some weaker shares to bring the total down. Furthermore, I will keep taking profits when share prices soar to ridiculous levels. Even with these two reasons to trade, I expect to slow my overall trading activity.

Disclosure: I hold Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group, Reckitt, Haleon, Luckin Coffee, WH Group, Oriental Holdings and Haw Par Corporation at the time of this writing

Family-owned REITs in my portfolio

Earlier, I discussed the pros and cons of investing in a family business. In the same post, I went through my own stock portfolio to identify all family businesses and the families behind them. Among them were a few of my REIT holdings too. Let's discuss those first.

A REIT is a property business which must be run according to a set of strict guidelines. Formal restrictions are meant to prevent the majority shareholder or REIT manager from taking advantage of the other, minority shareholders. Of course, abuse is still possible and we should be alert to it. A family that controls a REIT is able to dump their undesirable properties into it, for example when they also own a property developer which is in need of cash. This means the REIT does not buy the best properties available in the market. Additionally, the family could also be overcharging for such properties. It's a subtle form of abuse, but let's still try to determine if this could potentially happen in my current REIT holdings.

ESR-LOGOS REIT

ESR-LOGOS has a 6% shareholder in the person of Mr Tong Jinquan. He is the owner of Summit Group, a real-estate developer in Shanghai. I don't think there is any overlap in the activities of Summit and ESR. As a side note, ESR Group is a larger shareholder and Mr Tong recently sold a large part of his shareholding to them. ESR-LOGOS was likely just an investment to Mr Tong and he seems to be withdrawing his involvement.

AIMS APAC REIT

On the list of major shareholders in AIMS APAC REIT two private shareholders attract our attention: Chan Wai Kheong 5.83% and George Wang 9.28%. Mr Chan is a hedge fund manager, who was also involved in a recent boardroom drama within Sabana Industrial REIT. Besides Sabana, I could not find any other real estate interests of him. Mr Wang, on the other hand,  is not only a shareholder of AIMS APAC REIT but also Chairman of The Board of Directors of its manager. Furthermore, he is the founder of AIMS Financial Group which still has an interest of 7.61% in AIMS APAC REIT which they founded, as the name already suggests. All in all, a powerful position, but I could not find any cases where AIMS APAC bought properties in which Mr Wang had an interest. Also, in this REIT we find the ESR Group again with a shareholding of 12.82% to somewhat counterpoint his influence.

Frasers Centrepoint Trust, Frasers Logistics & Commercial 

The Sirivadhanabhakdi family has large stakes in Frasers Centrepoint Trust and Frasers Logistics & Commercial Trust through their stake in Frasers Property. All three entities are multi-billion dollar operations with their own business dynamics. Although they still share the same website, I did not see any suspicious transactions between them. Let us also note that Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi did not set up this network of companies himself. He inherited this structure when he took over Fraser Property after winning the battle for its parent company the Fraser & Neave conglomerate in 2013. A battle that he mainly fought for the soft drinks division of Fraser & Neave rather than its real-estate holdings.

Sunway REIT

40.89% of the shares in Sunway Real Estate Investment Trust are owned by Sunway Berhad, which is controlled by the Cheah family. Sunway Berhad is a large Malaysian conglomerate with a lot of property development activities. As such, Sunway REIT taking over properties developed by Sunway Berhad is the whole idea behind the REIT. It owns malls, hotels, offices, a medical centre, industrial properties and a university campus, all developed by Sunway Berhad. I am not aware of any signals that these acquisitions were executed at any disadvantage to the minority shareholders of Sunway REIT.

Hutchison Port Holdings Trust

Hutchison Port Holdings Trust is not a REIT, but a business trust, which is comparable in nature. CK Hutchison Holdings Limited holds 30.07%, with the Li Ka-Shing family controlling CK Hutchison. Part of the port activities of CK Hutchison was disposed to the trust at its conception in 2011, more specifically the container terminals in the Pearl River Delta, China. I don't think any assets were added to the trust ever since, so there is not much to watch here. The share has been performing quite bad for other reasons. It looks like the valuation (P/E, P/B) simply deteriorated rather than the business performance. Maybe the stock is too boring to hold for a long time and consequently it can now be bought at a very low valuation, which I did.

The other REITs I hold have no family involvement. If I overlooked anything, feel free to alert me in the comments below. 

ESR Group Ltd

I am not invested in ESR Group, but I noticed their presence in AIMS APAC, ESR-LOGOS (obviously), Sabana Industrial REIT (20%) and Cromwell European REIT (28% through Cromwell Property Group).

Perhaps this should not surprise me because I prefer to invest in industrial and logistics properties and ESR considers itself a REIM (Real Estate Investment Manager) in this particular sector and focused on Asia too. This means they develop, buy, sell and manage logistics properties, similar to the recently transformed Capitaland Investment Ltd. I don't like to invest in REIM's, since it is basically trading and the profits come and go depending on economic cycles. It's also a key people-based business and those key people may leave. There is not really any moat. Besides all that, the balance sheet of ESR looks quite over-levered with debt.

ESR Group grew fast in recent years. In 2021, they took over ARA/LOGOS. Their holdings in Cromwell and ARA-LOGOS (now ESR-LOGOS) are the result of this acquisition. The last one is clearly within the focus of ESR Group, but I am not so sure about the office-oriented Cromwell Property Group, which is an Australian developer. Their Cromwell European REIT is 50/50 invested in offices and logistics properties in Europe. But note that ESR Group's focus is Asia rather than Europe. I wonder if Cromwell Property Group and Cromwell European REIT might be disposed of by ESR at some time. 

Maybe the conclusion from this review is that I should monitor ESR Group more closely rather than the family holdings in the REITs I own. 

Disclosure: at the time of posting this article, I hold shares in Sunway REIT, ESR-LOGOS REIT, AIMS APAC REIT, CK Hutchison, Hutchison Port Holdings Trust, Cromwell European REIT, Sabana Industrial REIT, Fraser & Neave, Frasers Centrepoint Trust and Frasers Logistics & Commercial.