24 November 2023

Sold out: post-fraud, triple bagger Luckin Coffee Inc ADR (OTC:LKNCY)

Bought 31 May 2022 at 10 USD

Sold 40% on 6 Febr 2023 at 27 USD 

Sold 60% on 16 Nov 2023 at 31.40 USD

At the time of my buy, the insiders responsible for doctoring the fraudulent sales figures were already identified, removed from the management team and in negotiations to sell their shares. Luckin was involved in several legal procedures to settle damages with early investors, who were disadvantaged by the stock price collapse after the fraud was exposed. To be frank, I have no legal background and did not fully understand all the procedures and documents involved. Every time a case was settled, another procedure was revealed, or some new legal milestone was mentioned. 

Yet, I could sense that a clean-up operation was ongoing, driven by the Chinese fund Centurium Capital, which also became the majority shareholder. Unfortunately, Centurium prefers to operate behind the scenes; there was (and still is) little information available about Centurium Capital and its intentions. The rapid development of the Luckin coffee business itself was much easier to observe. Although I do not speak Chinese, I was able to collect information about Luckin and its successes from online sources like Baidu Maps, YouTube clips, social media reviews and news articles. 

From the incomplete information and my anecdotal impressions, I concluded that the company was genuinely working on its come-back as a legitimate company. In addition to that, the coffee shop network was clearly growing at a fast pace. I decided to buy the share, which seemed cheap at 10 USD. Considering the risk that I was wrong and fraud was still ongoing, I limited the Luckin holding to a few percent of my total portfolio. Still anxious about fraud risks, I sold 40% on 6 Febr 2023 at 27 USD, which meant I secured the return of my initial investment.

I held my remaining Luckin shares for 1.5 years, during which my trust in Luckin's legitimacy increased. Two extensive research reports, Quo Vadis Capital, Inc. and Snow Lake, both recommending a buy, solidified my conviction. In May 2023, I visited the three Luckin outlets that were opened in Singapore at that point. I am not crazy about Luckin's signature coconut latte, but I enjoyed its Americano, brewed of beans from the Yirgacheffe, Ethiopia region. It is a lot better than Starbucks' Americano. (Which is not a high threshold, to be fair). However, neither Luckin's coffee nor the shop experience is exceptional in any way.

I sold out my remaining holdings last week. I noticed that some company insiders are selling their Luckin shares at an increasing scale and pace. 

Especially the selling done by Mr. Reinout Hendrik Schakel gave me pause for thought. In 2019, Luckin hired Schakel as CFO to manage the NASDAQ listing. During the recent Q3 2023 financial results presentation, Schakel announced that he will depart from the company at the end of 2023 for personal reasons. I have two concerns with this development:

  1. Schakel's departure could be a sign that Luckin is not planning a relisting from the OTC market back to NASDAQ (or any other official market for that matter). It looks like Schakel concluded that, as the financial markets guy, he has no role left at Luckin. Or, to invert this observation, it would be very strange if Schakel left just before the company finally gets listed again.
  2. Besides leaving the company, Schakel sold all his shares. As an insider with a corporate finance background, Schakel is obviously in a better position to value the Luckin stock than me. It looks like he believes that the share is currently overvalued. It also looks like he is not expecting any take-out offer on the shares from Centurium Capital. 

I usually avoid holding stocks in unregulated or lightly regulated markets like OTC. In Luckin's case, I was holding out for a relisting to an official market. After losing my confidence that this will happen any time soon, I see no other catalysts worthwhile waiting for. 

As in the case of my buy, I also made my sell on the basis of impressions and incomplete information. Luckin does not communicate any details besides the bare minimum required. There is just not enough information to go on. 

I applaud the current management team for running one of the fastest-growing businesses in the world. Luckin generates a lot of positive press with innovative marketing actions. Its customers love it. Should the company relist at an official exchange, I might be interested in buying the shares again. 

Disclosure: no positions in Luckin Coffee or Starbucks at the time of publishing this blog

23 November 2023

Bought: a bunch of consumer staples stocks

I described how I liquidated my infrastructure-related stocks and REITs in earlier posts this year. I bought several companies in the consumer staples sector to replace these holdings. In the post about my L'Occitane buy, I clarified that I consider brand-based consumer staples stocks as inflation hedges. I let Warren Buffett present the reasoning through one of his quotes. Soon after buying L'Occitane, I also added Creightons to my cosmetics holdings. After these two, I bought several other consumer staples stocks, which I didn't describe yet. Time for an overview.

Bought: Italmobiliare SpA (ITM.IT)

Starting with yet another cosmetics company, at least partly. Italmobiliare is the majority owner of the oldest cosmetics brand in the world: Santa Maria Novella. It also owns the Italian coffee brand Borbonne. Both Santa Maria Novella and Borbonne are snowballing and developing their international expansion. Italmobiliare itself is the holding company for the Pesenti family, which has a long entrepreneurial history in the cement business, among other activities. The family runs Italmobiliare as an investment holding with a wide range of activities, where Borbonne and Santa Maria Novella are now by far the largest holdings.  

The idea was presented in the blog Value and Opportunity. This is the best European equity investment blog, in my opinion. I have been reading it for years, although I never had an investment in common with blogger memyselfandi007. Italmobiliare is the first. Another German blogger, Jonathan Neuscheler, followed up with his own analysis of Italmobiliare. Overall, Jonathan agreed with the findings of Value and Opportunity, and he bought the stock too.

Bought: Compagnie Du Bois Sauvage (COMB.BE)

Another family holding in Europe. This time in Belgium with the Paquot family in charge. The company makes and sells luxury chocolates under several brands: Neuhaus, Jeff de Bruges, Corné Port Royal en Artista Chocolates. Besides the chocolate business, the holding has minority investments in Umicore (batteries, recycling), Noël Group (extrusion of synthetic and bio-based materials), Berenberg Bank (German corporate banking), Ÿnsect (mealworms as alternative food), real estate in Europa and the US. Two smaller industrial holdings, Futerro and Galactic, are also involved in sustainability-related engineering.

There is not much public information about Compagnie Du Bois Sauvage, but I was still able to dig up some facts and draw conclusions from those. I will most likely share these soon in a separate blog posting.

Bought: Agronomics Ltd (LSE:ANIC)

This buy also deserves a separate blog post. Let me give a brief introduction for now. Agronomics is a venture capitalist investing in cellular agriculture. This means that Agronomics invests in companies that cultivate meat, but not by breeding, raising, and slaughtering animals in the traditional way. Instead, stem cell tissue is taken unobtrusively from an animal, transferred to a bioreactor and supplied with nutrients to grow it. Under the right conditions, the cells will grow into steaks and other meat products, sometimes within days. Note that the result is the same as a 'real' steak up to the molecular level. We are not talking about meat alternatives, where the experience of eating meat is simulated with plant-based ingredients such as soy, peas and gluten. (I find these disgusting, by the way.) Agronomics has a few older investments in such plant-based meat alternatives, but management decided to go all-in on cellular agriculture at some point.

Biotech companies are already producing edible, cultivated meat products, albeit in laboratories on a small scale and at very high costs per kilogram of food. Similar methods can also produce dairy, egg whites, seafood, chocolate, pet food, human breast milk, cotton, leather, and palm oil. Agronomics is involved in some of these initiatives too. Similar to cultivated meat production, the production is still at a small scale and has a very high cost per unit of end product. We are only in the beginning phase of this food revolution. Biotech startups are working on the consumer staples of the future. I found it suitable to include a company from this new food industry in my consumer staples portfolio.

Top-up: InNature Berhad (5295.KL)

InNature holds the rights to sell The Body Shop cosmetics in Malaysia (except Sarawak), Vietnam, and Cambodia. These rights are exclusive and apply to real-life shops as well as online stores. The bulk of sales is in Malaysia, where it is going well: high margins, high ROIC, and hardly any debt. I bought this family-owned company a year ago and have been following it ever since. The company's engagement with its target audience seems excellent. Over 70% of the group’s transactions come from its loyalty program members

There are definitely challenges to the business. Tourist visits to Malaysia have disappointed ever since the COVID-19 pandemic, and consumer sentiment is subdued among local shoppers. In response, the stock price dropped quite a bit during the last few months. However, I am optimistic about The Body Shop for the long term. If that optimism is warranted, the stock is cheap at 0.40 RM. I decided to take this opportunity to top-up my initial InNature Berhad holding and take it to a full 4% position.

Bought: DKSH Holdings Malaysia Berhad (5908.KL)

I bought another Malaysian company, albeit a subsidiary of DKSH Holding Ltd Switzerland. The company connects consumer brands such as BOH Tea, Kalbe Farma, and Horlicks with retail outlets, primarily supermarkets and convenience stores. Similarly, it distributes medicines from drug manufacturers to pharmacies and clinics. 

Can these manufacturers not organize their own distribution? Sometimes, they do, but specific skills, a good reputation and a network of business connections are essential. A supermarket operator is usually not interested in offering new, unproven products on its limited shelf space. It needs to be convinced that enough advertisement and promotion will be done. On a more practical level, some types of food and medicine need a cold supply chain and reliable transportation. I believe DKSH enjoys a competitive advantage, even a moat, with its position between these parties. Just like in the case of InNature, my attention was drawn to the falling share price. DKSH Malaysia's share price looked cheap when I pulled the trigger.

Bought: Chlitina Holding Ltd (4137.TW)

One last cosmetics company. I promise. Chlitina (pronounced: kelitina) is a cosmetics brand that started in Taiwan but now gets the bulk of its revenue and profits from Mainland China. This family-owned and operated company is a franchisor of beauty salons. It trains franchisees in the beauty business and helps them set up their own beauty salon. Chlitina makes its money from collecting franchise fees, but more importantly, by selling Chlitina-branded skincare and beauty products to the franchisees who re-sell those to their salon visitors.

This franchise model does not require much capital for Chlitina. Hence, its ROIC is typically between 20% and 30%, except during the COVID-19 lockdown periods during which the beauty salons were forced to close. Assuming a return to the pre-pandemic profits, the stock price seems low at a P/E = 17 and a Shiller P/E (where E is the average E over the last ten years) = 13. 

The Chlitina salon network is already quite extensive in China and Taiwan; about 5,000 under the Chlitina brand, and another 600 under the RnD Nail and Eyelash name. We can not expect hyper-growth here, but there are still geographical areas to expand into. Recently, the company launched its concept in Vietnam. In addition, it built an e-commerce platform to sell Chlitina products directly to end consumers. We can expect revenue growth here. However, management must avoid cannibalizing the business of its franchisee's salons too much. That would create a conflict of interest. 

Bought: Mega Lifesciences PCL (MEGA.BK)

Mega Lifesciences sells branded health supplements and herbal products, mostly over-the-counter products, but some prescription pharmaceutical products as well. In 1982, it started the Mega We Care brand in Thailand. Over the years, the company introduced Mega We Care all over Southeast Asia and in several African countries. 

In Myanmar, the company also has a distribution business, which markets primarily third-party pharmaceuticals. The revenues from Myanmar are 40% of Mega's total revenues. If you consider that risky, I agree. I decided to accept this risk because Mega seems an attractive investment on most other metrics: no debt load, very high ROIC, growth, and high free cash flows resulting in dividends and sensible re-investments. The relative contribution of the Myanmar-based business to Mega's total revenues is shrinking because of its fast growth in other markets. I also considered that neither the Myanmar government nor the rebellious forces would have any rational interest in destroying a pharmaceutical distribution network. Still, the different conflicts within Myanmar could seriously disrupt Mega's business. I managed this risk by allocating it just 1% of my portfolio.

Bought: PT Industri Jamu dan Farmasi Sido Muncul Tbk (SIDO.ID)

Sido Muncul provides herbal medicine, beverages, vitamins, supplements and pharmaceutical products. The business is comparable to Mega, but Sido Muncul has limited itself to Indonesia, where it has a widely-known brand name. The high margins, high ROIC, low debt burden, and growth figures are similar to Mega. We often see favorable financials with companies that provide over-the-counter personal care products, especially when their brands have been around for a long time and are trusted by consumers. People are generally quick to self-medicate with trusted products when they are in pain or feeling under the weather. It's a widespread habit, even among people who also consult a doctor when feeling bad. For that reason, I also have sector peers like Haleon, Reckitt, Haw Par, Da Ren Tang, Tong Ren Tang, Baiyunshan, PT Tempo Scan, and Kotra Industries in my portfolio. 

Bought: Kotra Industries Berhad (0002.KL)

As mentioned above, I bought shares in Kotra Industries, also known as Kotra Pharma. The reasons are similar to Mega and Sido Muncul. Kotra sells health supplements under the brand name Appeton. These supplements are sold over-the-counter and based on Western science, i.e. vitamins, omega-3, prebiotics, etc. Kotra has been selling these for decades, but only in recent years sales figures are taking off. The marketing is straightforward: supplements for children show pictures of children on the packaging, and those for the elderly show the elderly. There are also products for toddlers, pregnant women, athletes and skinny people who want to gain weight. Prices are low compared to competing products. Kotra has started selling Appeton in other Southeast Asian markets, as well as in several African countries.

Kotra Industries sells about 200 other pharmaceuticals in the over-the-counter market, as well as prescription-based. These products are lesser known than Appeton, but generally yield good sales numbers too. Prescription pharmaceutical sales are almost half of Kotra's total revenue. I find the prescribed medicine category harder to analyze than the over-the-counter sales. The first depends on regulatory developments, while the latter depends on excellent marketing. Therefore, I took a small (1%) position in Kotra instead of a full (4%) position. I may top up this position as my understanding of Kotra increases.


Disclosure: At the moment of publishing this blog: Long L'Occitane, Creightons, Italmobiliare, Compagnie du Bois Sauvage, Agronomics, InNature, DKSH Holdings Malaysia, Chlitina Holding Ltd, Mega Lifesciences, Sido Muncul, Haleon, Reckitt, Haw Par, Da Ren Tang, Tong Ren Tang, Baiyunshan, PT Tempo Scan, and Kotra Industries. No positions in Interactive Brokers, DKSH Holdings Ltd Switzerland, and Kalbe Farma.


18 November 2023

Sold off: infrastructure assets

When I started this blog, I bought shares in three categories: consumer staples, infrastructure-related companies and online portals. Nowadays, I only entertain the first category. First, I sold off all my tech companies during their wild share price movements in early 2023. The volatility made me realize that I don't fully comprehend what drives the valuations of these tech giants. In the case of Alibaba and Tencent, for example, the Chinese government has a particular interest and involvement, which seems impossible to gauge. In the case of Meta Platforms, there were concerns about the costs of its Metaverse, which I found equally impossible to evaluate.

Mid 2023, I also started selling off my infrastructure-related companies and REITs. These types of stocks are easier to understand than tech. However, another reason to avoid this sector emerged: increasing debt burdens. Hard assets are almost always bought with leverage. I believe that interest rates will be higher for longer. I started by selling off particularly vulnerable companies like Ho Bee Land. Over the months, I grew increasingly uncomfortable with leverage, even for my holdings with relatively strong balance sheets. I scrutinized all my infrastructure-related holdings individually and made the following sell decisions.

Sold: Anhui Expressway Co Ltd (HKSE:00995), Qilu Expressway Company Ltd (HKSE:01576), Jiangsu Expressway Co Ltd (HKSE:00177)

The 'higher interest rates for longer' mantra may not apply to China, at least not for now. These toll road operators are not under immediate debt pressure, but I had other concerns. Chinese toll road operators generally do not disclose their concessions' end date. However, we can compare the total yearly amortization of the concession value with the total remaining concession book value. We then realize the average remaining concession is often only 10 - 15 years. After expiration, the toll road operator has no assets left unless it negotiates renewals for its concessions or gets new concessions. It's hard to gauge whether concessions will be renewed and at what price. Consequently, it's hard to establish a valuation for these operators. It's like a discounted cash flow formula with or without a terminal value. As I argued in the industrial S-REITS article, that means a huge difference in the DCF calculation result.  I find the valuation calculations too uncertain to hold on to these toll road operators. 

Sold: Qingdao Port International Co Ltd (HKSE:06198), China Merchants Port Holdings Co Ltd (HKSE:00144) 

Qingdao Port announced a restructuring of its ports in the form of a combination with sister companies. They issued a 32-page document describing the transactions in legal language. Honestly, I could not get the gist of it. Qingdao Port is a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE). The transaction may have some political purpose rather than a business optimization goal. But again, I am puzzled about what was going on in the first place. I found that reason enough to sell. In the same light, I sold off China Merchants, also an SOE with investments outside China that I found hard to justify business-wise.

Sold: Suria Capital Holdings Bhd (XKLS:6521) 

Another port operator, but this time in Malaysia. It is also an SOE, majority-owned by the state of Sabah. The holding contains all ports in Sabah and, as a monopoly, is doing well. However, the growth thesis is based on a large development project next to the port of Kota Kinabalu, which will offer residential and commercial properties. I have no particular insights into the Malaysian real estate sector. Frankly, I should have thought of that before buying the share. Suria Capital has no debt and may be an interesting share for investors who do have detailed insights into the sector.

Sold: China Tower Corp Ltd (HKSE:00788)

Back to mainland China. China Tower Corp is a joint venture of the three leading telecom operators within China: China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom. These three operators sold their telecom towers to China Tower and leased them back. This is a standard construction within the telecom industry, but in this case, all four parties involved are SOEs. The construction makes sense, but there are also opportunities for transfer pricing. If not now, then in the future. It's hard to determine whether your interests as a foreign minority investor will always be considered.

Sold: CK Hutchison Holdings Ltd (HKSE:00001)

Well-known Hong Kong-based holding linked to the Li Ka-shing family. I held the share for over five years, during which its price dropped consistently. Thankfully, my overall loss is limited to only a few per cent, thanks to the high dividend payouts. 

The interest coverage ratio (ICR) of the holding is around 4. The debt burden is not an immediate threat. Still, you could calculate a worse ICR depending on how you account for associate companies' income and debts. CK Hutchison's multiple holdings structure is complex. In any case, however you calculate the ICR, it has been dropping recently. It could fall further, considering CK Hutchison was still borrowing at an average interest rate of only 2.7% until recently. The credit ratings from Fitch and Moody's for Hutchison's debt are still solid, resp A- and A2. Even so, at the moment of selling, CK Hutchison had the highest debt levels among my portfolio companies. 

Sold: Hutchison Port Holdings Trust (SGX:NS8U)

Together with CK Hutchison, I also sold its associate Hutchison Port Holdings Trust (HPHT), a business trust listed in Singapore. Its debt burden is increasing. I calculated an ICR of about 3.7 on 30 June 2023, but a lot of debt has to be re-negotiated soon, which will be at higher rates in the current interest rate environment. Profits will increasingly be re-directed from dividends to interest payments and debt repayments. 

Let me also address the assets' life expiry issue for this trust. HPHT indicates that the concessions for its ports expire from 2038 to 2055. They don't provide the details to calculate a weighted average expiry, but in the case of its Hong Kong ports, it is June 2047. (I assume this date is related to the expiry of the Special Administrative Region status of Hong Kong.) On the other hand, HPHT currently offers a dividend yield of more than 10%. The investor seems sufficiently compensated for the risk that the port concession will not be extended to HPHT. The debt burden, rather than the concession expiries, turned me away from the stock.

The low ROIC of infrastructure stocks

To conclude this blog, an observation about another issue: low return-on-invested-capital (ROIC) yields. Almost all infrastructure-related stocks have low ROIC yields; let's take 4% as an example. This does not immediately seem a big issue when you buy the stock at a price-to-book lower than 1. Infrastructure-related stocks are often quoted at P/B < 1, meaning that the return-on-investment of your recently invested dollar is higher than 4%, for example, in the form of a 10% cash dividend yield, like in the case of HPHT.   

So far, so good, until your new company starts making new investments to either expand into new assets or refurbish existing assets. These new investments are most likely again at the typical low 4% yield for infrastructure and real estate. The free cash flows for the high dividends you enjoyed will be redirected to investments with a 4% ROIC, which you probably do not appreciate. In the long term, your low P/B bargain becomes a trap. I believe this is the mechanism Charlie Munger referred to in the following quote.

Over the long term, it is hard for a stock to earn a much better return than the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you re not going to make much different than a six percent return even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns eighteen percent on capital over twenty or thirty years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with one hell of a result. So the trick is getting into better businesses. And that involves all of these advantages of scale that you could consider momentum effects. How do you get into these great companies? One method is what I'd call the method of finding them small - get 'em when they're little. For example, buy Wal-Mart when Sam Walton first goes public and so forth. And a lot of people try to do just that. And it's a very beguiling idea. If I were a young man, I might actually go into it.

(Charlie Munger, Poor Charlies Almanack, 3rd Edition, Page 206. "The art of stock picking")

Disclosure: No positions in Alibaba, Tencent, Meta, Anhui Expressway, Ho Bee Land, Qilu Expressway, Jiangsu Expressway, Qingdao Port, China Merchants Port Holdings, Suria Capital, China Tower, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom, CK Hutchison, Hutchison Port Holdings Trust, and Wal-Mart