Sold out: Able Global Berhad (KLS:7167)

Able Global Berhad sells milk under the brand names Able Farm and Tarik Tarik. I had purchased a 0.5% position to feel out this stock. My rule is to double the starting position or sell it off when I don't feel confident about the company's prospects. The company has low debt, a good ROE, and a decent dividend yield. The stock price seems low compared to these fundamentals. So, why do I not feel confident?

Able Global is expanding its dairy business into Mexico. Analysts applaud their spirit of entrepreneurship, but I am confused about the reason for choosing this particular country. I have reviewed the company's publications but did not find any rationale for this choice. When a company expands its operations, it is typically done at the edge of its circle of competence. It would, for example, expand into a neighbouring country or a product line that supplements the current products. It is unclear why a company would jump from Malaysia into Mexico. Able Global increased its debt burden to support this effort, raising the stakes even higher.  

My second area of doubt concerns Able Global's digital brand strategy. There is no active presence of Able Farm on Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, or Facebook. But even worse, a search on Shopee does not even yield 25 listings of their products. You may argue that offering milk on a trading platform makes no sense because it would get spoilt during shipping. Let's clarify here that Able Farm offers condensed, evaporated and UHT milk variations, which you don't have to refrigerate. F&N and Dutch Lady provide similar products in the Malaysian market. Searching these brand names lists hundreds of results on both Shopee and Lazada. Where are the Able Farm products? Let me be clear that the products do exist. I have seen those used in various street food hawker stalls for which Malaysia is famous. There is likely a long-time functioning supply chain behind these products, possibly with third-party wholesalers. They might not see the need to advertise to the ultimate consumer. 

For my portfolio, I am looking for consumer staples where the brand name is the moat. Brand names must be supported by modern advertisements and other marketing efforts. The absence of modern marketing efforts for Able Farm and my reservations about the future Mexican operation made me conclude that the stock does not fit my requirements. I should have caught these objections because both already existed when I bought the stock. My lack of research and reflection was a mistake. By the way, selling the stock may also be a mistake when the Mexican operations take off successfully. I will be keeping an eye on the developments. Sold Able Global at 1.29 RM.

Disclosure: Long Fraser and Neave (F99 in Singapore)

Sold out: DFI Retail Group Holdings Ltd aka Dairy Farm

I regard Alibaba as one of the biggest mistakes I ever made. In thinking about Alibaba, I got charmed by their position in the Chinese internet and didn’t stop to realize, 'they’re still a gawd-damned retailer.'

(Charlie Munger, Daily Journal annual shareholder meeting, 15 February 2023)

Charlie Munger is unhappy about his Alibaba purchase. I can relate to that; I sold off mine last January already. But let’s notice his dim view of retailers in general here. Is retail such a lousy business? 

Turning around a retailer that has been slipping for a long time would be very difficult. Can you think of an example of a retailer that was successfully turned around? 

[...] in retail you have to be smarter than Wal-Mart. Every day retailers are constantly thinking about ways to get ahead of what they were doing the previous day. [...]

We would rather look for easier things to do.

(Buffett, Student Visit 2005)

Buffett is also pessimistic about the prospects of retailers. He seems to suggest that investors try to identify the smartest player in the sector, such as Wal-Mart, which is one of the success stories within Berkshire’s investing track record. 

Value investor Pat Dorsey is more specific in his book The Five Rules for Successful Stock Investing. 

Not surprisingly, we generally don’t find a ton of great long-term stock ideas in retail and consumer services because most economic moats for the sector are extremely narrow, if they exist at all. The only way a retailer can earn a wide economic moat is by doing something that keeps consumers shopping at its stores rather than at competitors’. It can do this by offering unique products or low prices. The former method is tough to do on a large scale because unique products rarely remain unique forever. It’s rare to find a retailer or consumer service firm that maintains any kind of economic moat for more than a few years.

Retail is generally a very low-return business with low or no barriers to entry. [...] The primary way a firm can build an economic moat in the sector is to be the low-cost leader. 

Let’s start our survey of DFI Retail Group here. Is it a low-cost leader, or does it offer something unique to survive the retail battlefield in the long term? I think neither. DFI has been struggling for several years, starting years before the Covid pandemic. It recently sold its supermarket operations in Malaysia and wrote down its investment in The Philipines.

An excellent introduction to DFI was written by Global Stock Picking. This blogger bought the stock in December 2017, traded in and out a few times, but sold it off in 2022. The blogger’s quote about DFI’s parent company Jardine Group drew my attention.

In a city like Hong Kong there are many examples of businesses that are protected due to vested interests from business owners, who are allowed to influence politics.

Globalstockpicking argues that DFI built its retail business in Hong Kong under the protection of a duopoly with Hutchison. We could theorize that DFI’s operations outside Hong Kong enjoy less success because they lack such a moat. In the latest FY2022 report, the Chairman remarks about DFIs’ future: “The Group’s overall results will largely depend on the recovery in Hong Kong of its Health and Beauty and Restaurants businesses, and an improved performance by its associate Yonghui on the Chinese mainland.” 

DFI’s focus is still on Hong Kong. However, I hesitate to rely on a strong economic come-back of Hong Kong for any investment success in the foreseeable future. Besides Hong Kong’s economic prospects, we can question whether DFI’s moat there is still intact, considering the political developments. The retail duopoly might be disrupted by new players entering the market.

A more pressing concern is DFI's debt which fails my criteria. In its FY2022 report, DFI discloses its interest cover at 3. However, there are several ways to calculate Interest Cover Rates. RHB Research sets it at 2 in their latest report, which is also my estimation. Moreover, 60% of the debt consists of floating-rate borrowings instead of fixed-rate agreements. DFI associate Yonghui, which runs supermarkets in mainland China looks quite leveraged too. Yonghui’s FY2022 financials have not been published yet, but its operating profits have been negative for a while. Considering the Chinese 2022 lockdowns, we can expect Yonghui’s 2022 performance to be poor again. On the bright side, China re-opened in 2023. From now on, earnings and operating cashflows for both DFI and Yonghui will recover at least somewhat. In that light, although leverage looks worrying it is not an immediate threat to the continuity of either company.

DFI was already a turnaround story before the Covid pandemic. In early 2020, Blogger CS Jacky pointed out the challenges and warned us, “The transformation plan to reshape DFI is a long-term endeavour”. Fast forward to 2023, and we can ask whether the turnaround is ongoing or has failed. To quote Warren Buffett again, “turnarounds seldom turn” (1979). Hence, I dislike relying on a business turnaround for my investment returns.

DFI reported its FY2022 financials in the same week as Haleon and Reckitt. I couldn’t help noticing how much easier their challenges seem compared to DFI. Why make an uncertain bet on DFI when more straightforward choices are around? KISS = Keep It Simple, Stupid. DFI also fails several of my checklist items. I am taking my loss at about -15% (including dividends), sold at 3.14 USD. Admittedly, at this price, DFI looks cheap on the surface, yet I am more confident making back my loss with another stock. To echo Buffett's quote from 2005 again... 

We would rather look for easier things to do. 

Disclosure: Sold out DFI and Alibaba. Currently long CK Hutchison, Haleon, and Reckitt.

Stocks recently bought and sold

Bought: Haleon PLC (LSE:HLN)

Haleon provides over-the-counter consumer healthcare products such as Sensodyne, Centrum, Panadol, Advil, Voltaren, Theraflu, and Otrivin. Such products will always be bought to relieve pain or increase health. The business seems suitable for my Coffee Can approach. Haleon is a spin-off from pharmaceutical company GSK (GlaxoSmithKline), whose current management wants to focus on its prescription medicine business. The IPO of Haleon was in July 2022, so there is no annual report yet. I had to piece my information together from the prospectus, two quarterly reports and analyst call transcripts. While the share price doesn't represent deep value, Haleon is relatively inexpensive.

Bought: Reckitt (LSE:RKT)

This is the company formerly known as Reckitt Benckiser Group. It has a healthcare division comparable to Haleon with health-related products such as Clearasil, Strepsils, and Durex. In addition, they have hygiene-oriented products such as Dettol, Vanish, Air Wick, Calgon, Lysol, and Harpic. Then finally, baby and children's nutrition products Enfamil and Nutramigen. Like Haleon, the demand for these consumer products should be mostly non-cyclical. Reckitt is a much older company than Haleon. Its share price has been going nowhere for years because the company made some expensive mistakes with its acquisitions. The CEO responsible for those has left the company. I expect that the company has learned from these mistakes and will move forward more carefully in the coming years. 

Bought: Haw Par Corporation Limited (SGX:H02)

Another personal healthcare company with only one brand name: Tiger Balm. I use this product myself after visiting the gym. Not so much for 'pain relief' as advertised, but more to emphasise the 'after-glow' feeling following a good workout session. Tiger Balm is trying to expand its product range to plasters, lotions, and even mosquito repellents. Besides the Tiger Balm business, Haw Par runs the Underwater World Pattaya aquarium and owns four commercial properties in Singapore and Malaysia. Its passive investments are a 4.5% share in UOB Bank Singapore, an 8.5% share in UOL, a developer in Singapore, and 600 mln in SGD cash on the balance sheet. If you analyse this collection of assets in detail, you will learn it is organised around the Wee family from Singapore. Family holdings like these are standard in Asia. Such shares will not give you quick profits through share price movements. The thesis rather lies in the safety of the assets and a decent dividend. 

Bought: Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group Corporation Limited (SGX:T14)

My final new buy in the consumer healthcare sector is a TCM company. A small position at not even 0.5% because the data I could collect about this business was minimal. The company is based in China. Unfortunately, its English 'Annual Report' is nothing more than the answers to the questions that the Singaporean Exchange provides as a framework for reporting. The answers provide a bare minimum of required data. It is hard to detect any tone of voice or indicator of mood from the management. Da Ren Tang is a 3 billion USD large-cap company, listed in 1997 and providing dividends all that time. Therefore, it is unlikely to be a fraudulent S-Chip. The goal of fraudsters is to collect money, not to distribute it. Finally, Da Ren Tang has no debts and a high ROIC. Its valuation seems decent, even low.

Sold: Okamoto Industries Inc (JPN:5122)

I sold Okamoto, a manufacturer of condoms. This company does not publish financial reports in English. Since I don't master Japanese, I always used Google Translate to gain insight into the views and strategies of the management. I did not get the gist of the limited comments they made. I am unsure whether the Google translations were poor or the words did not have much substance in the first place. While preparing my blog about family-owned companies, I discovered that the Okamoto family only holds 13% of the shares. That seems a relatively small commitment to support the 'skin-in-the-game' argument for family-owned companies. In summary, my conviction in Okamoto disappeared, and I sold it at a slight loss. 

Bought: WH Group Limited (HKSE:0288)

Another share where I only have just enough conviction. WH Group Limited engages in the production, wholesale, and retail sale of meat products in China, the United States, Mexico, and Europe. They have known meat brand names in all these regions. What are the advantages of such a worldwide approach? However, both the business and the share price are stable over time. 

Sold: Yum China Holdings, Inc. (HKSE:9987)

Yum China is the franchise holder for Pizza Hut, KFC, Taco Bell, Lavazza Coffee and a few local restaurant brands for Mainland China. Business is going well, and the share price has soared. When I bought this share, it was already priced high, but it has reached an extreme valuation by now. Just as an indication: the P/E is around 60. It is too optimistic. Let's consider that even when the expected growth occurs, there will be enormous workforce challenges. A restaurant chain does not scale up quickly and will need many workers. I decided to take my profits for now. I have put Yum China back on the watchlist and might purchase it again if it drops to an attractive valuation. 

Partially Sold: Luckin Coffee Inc (OTC:LKNCY)

My Luckin shares had a fantastic run. I bought my position for 9.95 USD per share, and it's nearing 30.00 USD now. Management is solving the issues related to the earlier fraud one by one while simultaneously growing the number of shops at a high pace. Let's hope they can soon re-list the shares on a regular exchange. Despite all the good news, I sold about 40% of my Luckin shares. The current share price represents a total market cap of 7.5 billion USD. The share may have reached a fair value by now. By selling 40% of my holding at almost 300% return, I am locking in my purchase price for the total holding plus some profits. Wherever Luckin's share price goes, I already made an overall profit. I will hold on to the remaining 60% and wait for a re-listing event before I decide on further actions.  

Shares in the most prominent Chinese coffee chain belong in a portfolio called Coffee Can APAC. However, at this stage, I am worried about the over-the-counter status of the stock. I also suspect that the meme-stock crowd is partly responsible for the recent share price rally. Luckin was mentioned on the WSB Reddit. Stocktwits and regular Tweets about Luckin are mostly meme pictures and hollow phrases cheering on the share price without providing any analysis of its fundamentals. That is all fine and well, but such uninformed investor herds can drop a share at a hat's tip again. 

Bought: Oriental Holdings Bhd (KLS:4006)

Oriental Holdings runs dealerships for Honda cars in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei and for the Mitsubishi brand only in Malaysia. It also holds a 15% stake in the Malaysian assembler and distributor of Honda cars. In addition, it makes plastic products to support car manufacturing. The second most significant activity of Oriental Holdings is owning and managing oil palm plantations in Indonesia and Malaysia. Furthermore, it owns nine hotels which are marketed under the Bayview label. It also built and runs a hospital in Malacca, Malaysia, and trades building materials. Yes, it is a conglomerate entering my portfolio again, violating my checklist a few times. Yet, the long-term vision behind the management's approach gives this share a Coffee Can vibe. Oriental Holdings holds a lot of real estate and land, which seems undervalued on its balance sheet. This will be interesting to explore in future blogs. The stock is locally considered 'sleepy', but occasional announcements prove that the management is actively developing the business. Recently, some plantations co-owned with the Loh family, the majority owner of Oriental Holdings, were sold to the holding, which now has full ownership. This should raise revenues and profits in the short term.  

Sold: Suntec Real Estate Investment Trust (SGX:T82U)

I did some rethinking about my REIT holdings; let's call it REIThinking. Interest rates have been rising recently, which prompted me to look at the debt levels of my current REIT holdings. Suntec has a Gearing Ratio of 43.7%. The Interest Rate Coverage is 2.6, while only 53% of its debt is financed with fixed interest rates. As a side note, I rely on the excellent blog REIT_TIREMENT for financial summaries on all Singaporean REITs. Suntec was the weakest among all my REIT holdings on debt indicators. I don't think Suntec is in distress in any way. Nevertheless, it is my preference to switch to other investments.

Sold: ESR-Logos REIT (SGX:J91U)

A similar story to Suntec. Gearing is 41.8% with an ICR of 2.8. At least, ESR-Logos secured 72% of debts at fixed interest rates. The weighted average debt maturity is 2.9 years. Besides the leverage, I am worried about the involvement of ESR Group Ltd in several of my REIT holdings, as I expressed in an earlier blog. The fundamentals of ESR Group itself do not look rock-solid to me. Of course, it is just the sponsor and manager of my REITs, but with deteriorating financials, there might be an impact on the REITs they own and manage. For my own peace of mind, I will cut some exposure. 

Sold: Sunway REIT (KLS:5176)

Sunway REIT is Malaysian and not covered by REIT-TIREMENT, so I had to go out and collect the relevant data myself. Unfortunately, the leverage picture was not pretty. Gearing 41%, ICR is 2.8, with only 32% of the debt on fixed rates. On a different note, I don't like it when a REIT has one dominant party as its tenant. I recently wrote a new checklist item on that. In this case, that predominant tenant is Sunway Berhad, albeit through different legal entities. Can you really negotiate rents freely with such a dominant tenant? Again, there is no sign of immediate distress concerning this REIT. It's just me following my checklist rules.

Sold: Camellia PLC (LSE:CAM)

As I described earlier, this company violates three of my checklist rules. The business is commodity-based, organised as a conglomerate and primarily located in India and Africa. It is a problematic business sector, and the company needs better management. Lately, they have shown some willingness to dispose of non-core activities. They also vacated its posh headquarters to re-develop it for residential purposes. But it is too little, too late. I sold most of my holdings and will sell the remaining part when I need liquidity for another share purchase.

Sold:  JD.COM (HKSE:9618), Alibaba (HKSE:9988), Tencent (HKSE:0700), Meta Platforms (META)

I sold all my online platform shares, some of them at a considerable loss. I recently concluded that I find it impossible to truly understand these businesses. When I started my Coffee Can portfolio in early 2022, I defined three pillars to distinguish my shareholdings: 1) Consumer Staples 2) Infrastructure 3) Large online platforms. I came up with these buckets because most of my existing shareholdings were within these categories already.  

During 2022, we learnt that political developments strongly impact the profitability of large internet companies. Chinese government interferes in different ways than the US government, but government actions are hard to predict in both countries. Adding to the complexity, we also need to foresee whether the companies remain relevant from a technological and marketing perspective. For example, I read dozens of articles, tweets and blogs on the Metaverse, but I am still unsure whether this will pan out in any usable way. Following online businesses and thinking about the technology sector proved time-consuming and impractical. I opted for simplicity and dropped bucket 3) altogether. I should have a 'too hard' basket if Warren Buffett has one too.

Sold: Sun Art Retail Group Limited (HKSE:6808)

This sell trade is linked to the Alibaba sell-off mentioned above. Alibaba has a majority share in Sun Art Retail. Management is combining the operations of both entities. The share price movements of both listings correlate strongly. There will likely be a take-over offer by Alibaba for Sun Art at some point. I see no particular value in holding on to Sun Art.

Conclusion

As a buy-and-hold investor, I did an awful lot of trading. I chalk this up to the startup hurdles of the Coffee Can project. First, I sold some existing holdings that do not conform to the Coffee Can idea. Later on, I made the strategic decision to drop the technology bucket 3). This resulted in five sell trades as described above. Then I made some improvements to my buy checklist. I added requirements, such as a diversified tenant base for REITs. In addition, I sold off some weaker REITs in response to rising interest rate levels. Then finally, I took some profits with Yum China and Luckin. 

I held 75 shares at some point. I reduced this to 64 holdings, which is still too much to keep track of. I will likely sell some weaker shares to bring the total down. Furthermore, I will keep taking profits when share prices soar to ridiculous levels. Even with these two reasons to trade, I expect to slow my overall trading activity.

Disclosure: I hold Tianjin Pharmaceutical Da Ren Tang Group, Reckitt, Haleon, Luckin Coffee, WH Group, Oriental Holdings and Haw Par Corporation at the time of this writing